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Supreme Court Decision Protects Right to Immigration Advice
Supreme Court Holds that Courts Have Jurisdiction to Review Motions to Reopen
Congress Ends The Widow Penalty (This Law expired on October 28, 2011. This article remains posted for information and future use of the law for which the applications/petitions are eligible for)
USCIS Announces Proposed H-1B Electronic Registration System to Reduce Costs for U.S. Businesses
Supreme Court Decision Protects Right to Immigration Advice
On March 31, 2010, Supreme Court held that criminal defense lawyers must advise their noncitizen clients about the risk of deportation if they accept a guilty plea. The Court recognized that current immigration laws impose harsh and mandatory deportation consequences onto criminal convictions, and that Congress eliminated from these laws the Attorney General’s discretionary authority to cancel removal in meritorious cases. The Court said, “These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.” The case, Padilla v. Kentucky, involved a Vietnam War veteran who has resided lawfully in the U.S. for over 40 years. His criminal defense lawyer told him not to worry about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a crime, but that advice was wrong. In fact, the guilty plea made Mr. Padilla subject to mandatory deportation from the United States. The state of Kentucky said that Mr. Padilla had no right to withdraw his plea when he learned of the deportation consequence. Today’s decision reverses the Kentucky court. It also rejected the federal government’s position (which had been adopted by several courts) that a noncitizen is protected only from “affirmative misadvice” and not from a lawyer’s failure to provide any advice about the immigration consequences of a plea. The right to counsel is at the very core of the criminal justice system. The Court affirms that immigrants should not be held accountable when they rely on incorrect advice from their lawyers or where counsel fails to provide any immigration advice at all.
Supreme Court Holds that Courts Have Jurisdiction to Review Motions to Reopen
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. ___, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 764 (Jan. 20, 2010)
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review a BIA decision denying a motion to reopen.The case focuses on the scope of INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), the bar to judicial review of discretionary decisions. This section provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review … any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” In the underlying decision, Kucana v. Holder, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit had said that this provision applies to determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General through regulation. Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, motions to reopen, which are discretionary by regulation, are not reviewable. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, finding that § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review only of determinations made discretionary by statute.
The Court began its analysis by noting that a “motion to reopen is an ‘important safeguard’ intended to ‘ensure a proper and lawful disposition’ of immigration proceedings” and that there is long history of judicial review over reopening decisions. Employing tools of statutory interpretation, the Court looked to § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s context and placement in the statute. It found that the surrounding judicial review provisions, § 242(a)(2)(A) (barring review over expedited removal decisions under § 235(b)(1)) and § 242(a)(2)(C) (barring review where person is removable based on specified criminal grounds) depend on statutory provisions, not on regulations, to define their scope. The Court also found that § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) must be read in conjunction with § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), which likewise bars review over the granting of relief under specified statutory provisions (namely, waivers under 212(h) and 212(i), cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and adjustment of status). Moreover, the Court found significant the character of the decisions Congress enumerated in § 242(a)(2)(B), which are “substantive decisions . . . made by the Executive in the immigration context as a matter of grace.” Such decisions are distinguishable from decisions on motions to reopen, which are a procedural device “serving to ensure that aliens are getting a fair chance to have their claims heard.” Finally, the Court found that had Congress intended the jurisdictional bar to apply to decisions specified as discretionary by regulation, it could have said so explicitly as it did in other places.
Next, the Court looked to the history of the motion to reopen and judicial review provisions. The Court noted that through IIRIRA Congress simultaneously codified the motion to reopen statute and numerous bars to judicial review of executive decisions. “Had Congress elected to insulate denials of motion to reopen from judicial review,” the Court said, “it could have so specified together with its codification of directions on filing motions to reopen.”
Finally, the Court found that any “lingering doubts” about § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) would be resolved by the presumption in favor of judicial review. There is no “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress intended to bar review over determinations made discretionary by regulation. Moreover, the Court said that under the Seventh Circuit’s construction of the statute “the Executive would have a free hand to shelter its own decision from abuse of discretion appellate review simply by issuing a regulation declaring those decisions ‘discretionary.’ Such an extraordinary delegation of authority cannot be extracted from the statute Congress enacted.”
This landmark decision has protected the immigrants' rights to challenge the BIA's denial of motion to reopen under the "abuse of discretion" standard.
Congress Ends The Widow Penalty (Note: This Law expired on October 28, 2011. This article is remained posted for information and future implementation of the law for which applications/petitions were filed prior to the sun set date of this law).
On October 28, 2009, President Obama signed on the bill that became Public Law Number 111-83, ending Widow Penalty. The bill contains two measures to address survivors’ issues: 1) self-petitioning rights for all widow(er)s of American citizens and their children; and 2) certain survivors’ rights for other immigrants.
PART ONE: WIDOW(ER)S OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND THEIR CHILDREN
The law removes the two-year marriage requirement from the current law (Immigration and Nationality Act Section 201(b)(2)(A)(i)) that permits widows and widowers (“widow(er)s”) of U.S. citizens to file a self-petition for themselves and their children, while retaining the requirement to show a good faith marriage. The law does not alter the rights of widow(er)s who were married two years or more, who have been able to self-petition since 1990.
It will allow a widow(er) who was married less than two years at the time of the citizen spouse’s death to file an I-360 self-petition form within two years of the law’s passage. This self-petition can be filed concurrently (together) with an Application for Adjustment of Status to Lawful
Permanent Resident (Form I-485) if the widow(er) is in the United States pursuant to a lawful entry. If the widow(er) is outside the United States, he or she can apply for an immigrant visa following the I-360 approval. The law does not require that a petition have ever been filed by the U.S. citizen spouse.
In cases where the widow(er) was already the beneficiary of an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative filed prior to the citizen petitioner’s death, it is anticipated that such I-130 petitions can be considered automatically converted to an I-360 self-petition. Current regulations already allow such auto-conversion for self-petitions. 8 C.F.R. 204.2(i)(1)(iv). It is anticipated that USCIS will apply those regulations to the new law, and allow for a previously denied I-130 petition (and accompanying I-485 application) to be reopened and approved as an I-360 petition.
Until such time as guidance is issued, however, be aware that there is a two-year window during which widow(er)s must file an I-360 following the law’s passage. If you are relying on the automatic conversion of a previously-filed I-130 petition, be aware that an I-360 should be filed within the two years following the law’s passage if guidance is not established by that time.
Does the law require me to obtain an Affidavit of Support Sponsor?
No. The law allows the widow(er) to self-petition, which removes the requirement that another person file an affidavit of support on behalf of the immigrant. Form I-864, Affidavit of Support, will not be required of self-petitioners. Widow(er)s must still prove they are not likely to become a public charge, based on a totality of factors listed under INA Sec. 212(a)(4)(B).
Does the law allow my children to be included?
Yes. Unmarried children of the widow(er) may be included on Form I-360 that is filed by the widow(er). Those children who are under the age of 21 years at the time the petition is filed should be eligible, as well as those children whose age determination is calculated under 201(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Child Status Protection Act, or “CSPA”). CSPA allows children to qualify, even when over age 21, where the petition was filed before the child’s 21st birthday. CSPA calculations can be difficult, so competent counsel should be consulted.
If an I-130 was previously filed by the U.S. citizen on behalf of the child before the child’s 21st birthday, such petition may be considered automatically converted, and may be used to establish the child’s age for self petitioning purposes. This will be particularly helpful in cases where children have already reached age 21 at the time of the law’s passage. In cases where the child is still under 21 at the time of the law’s passage, however, it is urged that widow(er)s file the I-360 self-petition for themselves and their children in case of controversy over this auto-conversion and CSPA interpretation.
Can I receive benefits if I have remarried?
While the self-petition provision in the new law specifically requires that the widow(er) not have remarried, the provision dealing with “Surviving Relative Consideration” (see PART TWO below) does not. That section requires a petition to have been filed previously, so if no previous petition was ever filed before the death, remarriage prior to receiving permanent resident status may foreclose benefits. If a petition was filed on your behalf by your spouse, but you have now remarried, please review PART TWO below.
Are there deadlines?
Yes. For those married less than two years at the time of the citizen’s death, the law permits the filing of a self-petition on Form I-360 within two years of the law’s enactment. Because the law was enacted October 28, 2009, the deadline is October 28, 2011. After this two-year period, a petition must be filed within two years of the citizen’s death. In cases where an I-130 was previously filed by the U.S. citizen, it can be considered to have automatically converted to an I-360 petition. Until guidance is issued, however, the two year deadline following enactment should be carefully reviewed and docketed by everyone affected. For those married at least two years at the time of the citizen’s death, the law remains the same: an I-360 must be filed within two years of the citizen’s death, unless automatic conversion occurs as explained above. This new law does not change that deadline.
PART TWO: OTHER SURVIVORS
What other benefits to survivors does the law provide?
The law adds a new section of law, Sec. 204(l), to the Immigration and Nationality Act. The new section allows petitions that were filed prior to the death to be adjudicated despite the death of the petitioner or the principal immigrant in cases where the beneficiary or derivative beneficiary resided in the United States at the time of the death and continues to reside in the United States. The law covers the following survivors:
• Immediate relatives (spouse, parent, minor child of a U.S. citizen)
• Family Preference relatives (unmarried son or daughter of a citizen, married son or daughter of a citizen, spouse or child of a permanent resident, brother or sister of a citizen)
• Employment-based dependents (derivative beneficiaries)
• Refugee/Asylee relative petition beneficiaries
• Nonimmigrants in “T” (victims of trafficking) or “U” (victims of crime) status
• Asylees
Does the law require an Affidavit of Support?
Yes. Unlike the self-petitioning widow(er)s (see PART ONE), 204(l) requires an Affidavit of Support, Form I-864. The law amends INA 213A(f)(5) to provide for a substitute sponsor in the case of a petition that is being adjudicated under the new INA 204(l).
I resided abroad at the time that my relative died. Am I covered under this new law? Only self-petitioning widow(er)s and their qualifying children (see PART ONE) are covered under the new law where the survivor resided abroad at the time of the qualifying relative’s death. If the petition was approved prior to the qualifying relative’s death, however, current “humanitarian reinstatement” provisions found at 8 C.F.R. 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2) may allow continued validity of the previously-approved petition, followed by consular processing of an immigrant visa. This would be the case even where the beneficiary was residing abroad.
Can I receive benefits if I have remarried?
While the self-petition provision in the new law specifically requires that the widow(er) not have remarried, the provision dealing with “Surviving Relative Consideration” does not.
Specifically, if a widow(er) resided in the United States at the time of the death of the qualifying relative and continues to reside in the United States, he or she shall have a petition or application for adjustment of status and any related applications adjudicated notwithstanding the death of the qualifying relative as long as the widow(er) “was…the beneficiary of a pending or approved petition for classification as an immediate relative…immediately prior to the death of his or her qualifying relative.” The clear language of the statute requires only that the person was an immediate relative immediately prior to the death. In the case of a widow(er) who remarries, this requirement is met despite the remarriage, provided a petition was filed prior to the death.
Can my petition still be denied?
The law gives the Secretary of Homeland Security some discretion to deny a petition if it is determined that approval would not be in the public interest. Most cases should be approved under this standard.
Will other related applications be adjudicated on the same basis?
Yes. New INA Section 204(l) provides that the petition, any application for adjustment of status,
“and any related applications” be adjudicated notwithstanding the death of the qualifying relative. It is clear from this provision that it was the intent of Congress that such cases be treated humanely, and that the death of the relative should not form the sole reason for denial. Applications related to petitions and applications for adjustment of status include such things as waiver applications (Form I-212, Form I-601).
Under the new law, it should be possible for survivors (including spouses of American citizens, and all listed survivors) to be approved for waivers of inadmissibility notwithstanding the death of the qualifying relative, provided a petition was filed by the qualifying relative prior to the death, or in the case of a derivative, on behalf of the qualifying relative.
(Note: This information is of a general nature and cannot be substituted for advice of competent counsel in an individual case.)
USCIS Announces Proposed H-1B Electronic Registration System to Reduce Costs for U.S. Businesses
March 2, 2011
WASHINGTON—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is publishing tomorrow a proposed rule that could save U.S. businesses more than $23 million over the next 10 years by establishing an advance registration process for U.S. employers seeking to file H-1B petitions for foreign workers in specialty occupations. The proposed electronic system would minimize administrative burdens and expenses related to the H-1B petition process—including reducing the need for employers to submit petitions for which visas would not be available under the statutory visa cap.
USCIS Director Alejandro Mayorkas today announced the opening of a 60-day comment period that will allow businesses and the general public to provide input on the proposed system in order to ensure it best meets the needs of employers that rely on H-1B visas to bring in foreign workers for specialty occupations.
“The proposed rule would create a more efficient and cost-effective process for businesses interested in bringing workers in specialty occupations to the United States,” he said. “Improving the H-1B petition process is part of USCIS’s ongoing efforts to leverage new ideas and innovation to streamline our operations and enhance customer service.”
Under the proposed rule, employers seeking to petition for H-1B workers subject to the statutory cap would register electronically with USCIS—a process that would take an estimated 30 minutes to complete. Before the petition filing period begins, USCIS would select the number of registrations predicted to exhaust all available visas. Employers would then file petitions only for the selected registrations. The registration system would save employers the effort and expense of filing H-1B petitions, as well as Labor Condition Applications, for workers who would be unable to obtain visas under the statutory cap.
The proposed rule, which posted to the Federal Register today for public viewing, contains complete details about the registration system and estimated cost savings. USCIS encourages formal comments on the proposed rule through www.regulations.gov. The comment period runs for 60 days, beginning March 3, 2011, and ending on May 2, 2011.
For more information on the proposed H-1B rule, please see the accompanying Fact Sheet. For more information on USCIS and its programs, visit www.uscis.gov.
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